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The strictest law sometimes becomes the severest
injustice.
– Benjamin Franklin1
I. INTRODUCTION
When it comes to advocating for a change in the law,
storytelling can be an extremely powerful tool.2 After all, “[l]egal
narratives transport readers to a world where the laws, though
familiar, have an effect on people’s lives that is altogether
unknown” and, as such, “set the background against which writers
can show readers the unseen consequences of laws.”3 For these
reasons, this Article begins with three stories—true stories in
fact—about three different men and the paths each took to
fatherhood. It is unlikely that these men have ever crossed paths
with one another. They live in different states and, further,
became fathers in different years and under different
circumstances. Nonetheless, the three men share a common
connection. Before the nature of that connection is revealed, let
me first recount the stories of S.F., Nathaniel, and Emile.
S.F. is an Alabama man, who in 1992 attended a party at the
home of a female friend, T.M.4 He arrived at the party intoxicated
and shortly thereafter passed out in a bed at T.M.’s house.5 The
other partygoers eventually left for the evening, leaving S.F. in the
sole care of T.M.6 When S.F. awoke the next morning, he was
surprised to find that all of his clothing—save his unbuttoned
shirt—had been removed during the night.7 Over the next few

1 CALVIN HELIN, DANCES WITH DEPENDENCY: OUT OF POVERTY THROUGH SELFRELIANCE 93 (2008).
2 See Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon A Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77
TENN. L. REV. 883, 886 (2009) (“We have known for some time that stories are among the
primary ways of making sense of the world, including the world of law.”).
3 Benjamin L. Apt, Aggadah, Legal Narrative, and the Law, 73 OR. L. REV. 943, 957
(1994). For this reason, Professor Mary Coombs classifies such stories as a form of “outsider
scholarship.” Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO.
L. REV. 683, 683 (1992).
4 S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 1188.
7 Id. at 1187.
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months, T.M. would openly boast to several people about how she
had engaged in sexual intercourse with S.F. while he was
unconscious.8 She would even go so far as to describe the evening
as one that had “saved her a trip to the sperm bank.”9 T.M. gave
birth to a child, and genetic testing confirmed that S.F. was the
biological father.10
Nathaniel became a father in 1995 as a California teenager.11
The mother of Nathaniel’s child was named Ricci and was thirtyfour at the time of conception.12 Nathaniel, however, was merely
fifteen.13 Although Nathaniel admitted to having sex with Ricci
voluntarily about five times, the fact that he was under sixteen
years of age at the time made it legally impossible for him to
consent to sexual intercourse.14 In other words, under California
law, Nathaniel was not only a new father, but also a victim of
statutory rape.15
Emile is a Louisiana man who in 1983 was visiting his sick
parents at the hospital—something he did quite regularly.16 One
evening, a nurse, Debra, offered to perform oral sex on Emile, but
only if he wore a condom.17 He accepted.18 At the end of their
sexual encounter, Debra agreed to dispose of the used condom.19
Emile, however, never witnessed this disposal and thus could not
say what Debra ultimately did with either the condom or its
contents—Emile’s sperm.20 Nine months later she gave birth to a
child, and genetic testing revealed a 99.9994% probability that

Id. at 1188.
Id.
10 Id. at 1186.
11 Cnty. of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 843 (Ct. App. 1996).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 843–44 n.1.
15 Id. at 843.
16 See State v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that from midAugust until early September, Frisard spent every night visiting his parents).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
8
9
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Emile was the father.21 The two never had sexual intercourse,
only the one instance of oral sex with a condom.22
What then is the common thread that runs through this story of
three fathers? Well, if you guessed that all three men ultimately
fathered children despite not having consented to the act that
produced these children, you would be partially correct. They also
share an additional similarity, one that many would find
somewhat surprising: Courts ordered each man to pay child
support for the resulting child.23
These stories are but three examples of men who have been
forced into fatherhood and the attendant obligation to pay child
support, despite not having consented to the act that led to
insemination.24 As such, these stories highlight a problem that
exists in the current approach to adjudicating child support.
Namely, the courts have focused exclusively on the child’s interest
in receiving support with the result that fathers are now strictly
liable for any biological child, regardless of any wrongful conduct
by the mother.25 Indeed, courts have been unwilling to allow
fathers to even raise consent as a defense to liability for child
support given the overriding policy that children are entitled to
financial support from both parents and, if the biological father is
not liable, then the child would be left with only one supporting
parent.26
Although others have pointed to the seemingly bizarre holdings
in the above referenced cases,27 these commentators have done so
Id.
Id. at 1036.
23 S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1186 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); County of San
Luis Obispo v. Nathanial J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 843 (Ct. App. 1996); Frisard, 694 So. 2d
at 1039–40.
24 See infra Part III for additional cases.
25 See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
26 See, e.g., In re Paternity of Derek S.H., 642 N.W.2d 645, No. 01-0473, 2002 WL 265006,
at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2002) (unpublished table decision) (holding that lower court
erred in submitting question of consent to jury).
27 See Ruth Jones, Inequality from Gender-Neutral Laws: Why Must Male Victims of
Statutory Rape Pay Child Support for Children Resulting from Their Victimization?, 36 GA. L.
REV. 411, 412 (2002) (noting that “statutory rape laws are not equally enforced against female
offenders, nor have such laws been crafted to address male victimization”); Dana Johnson,
Comment, Child Support Obligations that Result from Male Sexual Victimization: An
Examination of the Requirement of Support, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 515, 516 (2005)
21
22
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largely in a “Ripley’s Believe It or Not” fashion, expressing shock
and wonder at the courts’ rulings but offering no solutions or
alternative approaches to this admittedly difficult issue. The
purpose then of this Article is, first, to underscore these
criticisms—that the current approach and its attendant
justifications pose a grave injustice both to the men who are
pressed into the obligations of fatherhood and also to society,
which has an interest in protecting all citizens from sexual
assault. More importantly, however, this Article offers a new
objection and, on that basis, a proposed solution.
Specifically, the laws regulating artificial insemination
seriously undermine the courts’ justification that all children are
entitled to support from both biological parents. In that context, a
man, regardless of whether he is the sperm donor or the non-donor
husband of the inseminated female, only becomes the legal father
of an artificially inseminated child if he affirmatively consents. It
is incongruous to allow exceptions for formal sperm donors yet
wholesale deny similar protections for those who, although not in
the setting of a sperm bank, never consented to the use of their
sperm. Accordingly, this Article proposes a solution whereby
courts adopt an approach similar (albeit narrower) to that used in
artificial insemination cases to adjudicate child support claims
against those men who were forced into fatherhood as a result of
nonconsensual insemination.
To begin, Part II contains an overview of current law as it
relates to the determination and enforcement of child support
obligations. Part III, looking at the strict liability approach,
discusses cases where the biological father was held liable for child
support despite the fact that the child was conceived as a result of
sexual assault. Next, Part IV offers a critique of the courts’ use of
strict liability when adjudicating the child support obligations of
male victims of sexual assault, pointing out various flaws in this
approach and the resulting injustices. Part V then discusses the
(“[A]ddress[ing] the ways in which the law is inadequate to address male sexual victimization
in the context of child support obligations.”); Ellen London, Comment, A Critique of the Strict
Liability Standard for Determining Child Support in Cases of Male Victims of Sexual Assault
and Statutory Rape, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1957, 1958 (2004) (arguing that “the use of strict
liability has problematic implications for societal conceptions of gender”).
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laws relating to artificial insemination, where consent is very
much a relevant consideration when determining child support
obligations. Finally, this Article offers a proposed solution,
whereby, just as it is with artificial insemination, consent would
operate as an affirmative defense to child support obligations for
those fathers whose parenthood arose as a result of sexual assault.
II. THE LAW OF CHILD SUPPORT: AN OVERVIEW
Society has long had an interest in establishing a child’s
paternity, an interest driven primarily “by the desire to provide
support for children without making excessive demands on the
public coffers and the hope of reducing the incidence of
irresponsible procreative behavior.”28 In early common law,
however, an illegitimate child was considered “filius nullius,” the
child of no one.29 As such, not only could the child not inherit from
either parent, but she also had a very limited right to support from
her father.30 Indeed, “the common law contained no obligation for
maintenance of bastards until the enactment of the Elizabethan
Poor Laws in the sixteenth century,”31 which “authorized towns to
sue nonsupporting fathers in order to reimburse public aid.”32 In
contrast, the early American colonies, in what has been described
as a “legal innovation,” passed bastardy laws that affirmatively
28 Donald C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 30 (2003).
29 See HARI DEV KOHLI, LAW AND ILLEGITIMATE CHILD: FROM SASTRIK LAW TO STATUTORY
LAW 11 (2003) (“The incapacity of a bastard consists principally in this, that he cannot be
heir to any one, neither can he have heirs, but his own body; for, being ‘nullius filius,’ he is
therefore of kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from whom any inheritable blood can be
derived.”).
30 See DOMESTIC RELATIONS: CASES AND PROBLEMS 229 (Homer H. Clark, Jr. & Ann
Laquer Estin eds., 2005) [hereinafter DOMESTIC RELATIONS] (“It is also often asserted that
illegitimate children had no right to support from their fathers, but historical research
indicates that there were ecclesiastical remedies by which fathers could be and were
ordered to support their illegitimate children.”).
31 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 79 (1995).
32 Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests
of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1037 (2007);
see also FINEMAN, supra note 31, at 79–80 (“These laws, which imposed a duty of
maintenance on mothers as well as fathers, were explicitly designed to relieve the parish of
economic responsibility for children.”).
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required fathers to support their illegitimate children.33 As
Professor Daniel Hatcher describes, “[a]s early as 1808, courts
began to order noncustodial parents to pay financial support [to
mothers and children] . . . . By the 1930s, almost all states had
such child support statutes.”34
Shortly thereafter, the federal government became increasingly
involved in the issue of child support. The first step was taken in
1950, when “an amendment to the Social Security Act require[ed]
state welfare agencies to notify law enforcement officials when a
family received Aid to Families with Dependent Children” (AFDC)
on behalf of an abandoned or deserted child.35 AFDC was “created
to enable each state and jurisdiction to provide a minimum
standard of living to needy dependent children and, in some cases,
to their caretakers.”36 Subsequent amendments would increase
the ability of these state agencies “to obtain the address and
employment information of noncustodial parents and required
states to create single government units to pursue child support on
behalf of children receiving AFDC.”37
A problem persisted, however, in these early attempts to assist
needy children. Specifically, the statutes did not require the
custodial parent seeking AFDC to cooperate with the state in
pursuing child support against the noncustodial parent.38 Without
such a requirement, those mothers seeking benefits had little
incentive to provide the information necessary for the government
to identify nonpaying fathers, from whom the government could
33 FINEMAN, supra note 31, at 80; Drew D. Hansen, Note, The American Invention of
Child Support: Dependency and Punishment in Early American Child Support Law, 108
YALE L.J. 1123, 1144 (1999). As Professor Daniel Hatcher notes, the bastardy laws were in
addition to “poor laws and criminal nonsupport laws.” Hatcher, supra note 32, at 1038. Of
course, child support obligations extended not only to illegitimate children, but to the
children of divorce as well. Id. at 1036.
34 Hatcher, supra note 32, at 1036; see also Donna Schuele, Origins and Development of
the Law of Parental Child Support, 27 J. FAM. L. 807, 821, 834–35 (1988–1989) (discussing
the history of child support laws).
35 Hatcher, supra note 32, at 1041 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(11) (1988) (repealed 1996)).
36 SANDRA J. NEWMAN & ANN B. SCHNARE, SUBSIDIZING SHELTER: THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN WELFARE AND HOUSING ASSISTANCE 117 (1988).
37 Hatcher, supra note 32, at 1041.
38 See GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE’S END 59 (1998) (“[T]hough the 1967 [welfare
amendments] required states to improve paternity establishment programs, it did not
compel mothers to cooperate.”).
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then try to seek reimbursement. All that changed, however,
in 1974 when Congress enacted Title IV-D of the Social Security
Act, which “created a partnership between federal and state
government” to collect child support.39 This framework still exists
today,40 and a key provision of the law is that genetic mothers who
are receiving benefits must cooperate “in good faith” in
establishing paternity.41
Further changes came in 1996 when Congress passed the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA),42 which replaced AFDC with the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program.43 This new
program provides for the distribution of federal block grants to the
However, to receive these grants the state must
states.44
implement a plan for child and spousal support enforcement and
the plan must meet a number of requirements.45 Among other
requirements, the state must have in place expedited
administrative and judicial procedures for establishing paternity,
procedures for voluntary paternity acknowledgement, and the
previous requirement that applicants not only cooperate in
paternity adjudication but also assign to the state any child
support they may be owed.46
The purpose of this assignment is to “recoup the government
costs of welfare assistance.”47 After all, “[w]elfare is not free.”48 In
39 Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support
Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 345 n.85 (2005) (citing
Social Services Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2337, 2351–58
(1975)).
40 Hatcher, supra note 32, at 1041.
41 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(A) (2006); see also Jeffrey A. Parness, New Federal Paternity Laws:
Securing More Fathers at Birth for the Children of Unwed Mothers, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 59,
65–66 (2006) (discussing congressional guidelines on paternity establishment techniques
and enforcement of child support orders).
42 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
43 See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The PRWORA,
also known as ‘welfare reform,’ made sweeping changes in social policy relating to lowincome people.”).
44 PRWORA § 401, 110 Stat. at 2113.
45 Id. § 402.
46 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006) (listing requirements for state plans).
47 Hatcher, supra note 32, at 1042; see also Carmen Solomon-Fears, Child Support
Provisions in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171), in FAMILY STRUCTURE AND
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fact, “[o]ut of the $105 billion in child support debt nationwide, the
government claims half so it can seek to recoup the costs of welfare
As a result,
benefits provided to low-income families.”49
“[m]others, fathers, and children all become government debtors—
the mothers and children owe their child support rights and the
fathers owe the payments—until the welfare benefits are repaid in
full.”50
PRWORA has also put the federal government in a position to
maintain greater oversight and control over states’ participation in
the IV-D program. For instance, a state receiving TANF grants
must establish a Case Registry of all child support orders within
that state.51 Additionally, the law requires states to adopt the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, which permits state
agencies to send income withholding orders across state lines
directly to employers.52 Given that states must meet very specific
requirements in order to receive federal block grants under TANF,
it should come as little surprise that federal law now significantly
shapes “[s]tate laws governing establishment of paternity for
nonmarital children.”53
One of the direct ways in which federal law has influenced state
laws relating to child support is the way in which the federal
government has offered incentives to the states to collect as much
child support as possible. Specifically, every state now has in
place a federally-funded child support enforcement program,
designed to reward states with “incentive payments” relating to
SUPPORT ISSUES 85, 87 (Anne E. Bennett ed., 2007) (“Assigned child support collections are
not paid to families; rather, this revenue is kept by states and the federal government as
partial reimbursement for welfare benefits.”).
48 Hatcher, supra note 32, at 1030.
49 Id. In 2009, the latest year for which data has been reported, the amount climbed to
$107 billion. See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., FY 2009 PRELIMINARY REPORT (2010), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cse/pubs/2010/reports/preliminary_report_fy2009/.
50 Hatcher, supra note 32, at 1030.
51 42 U.S.C. § 654a(e) (2006); see also Carmen Solomon-Fears, Child Support
Enforcement: Program Basics, in FAMILY STRUCTURE AND SUPPORT ISSUES, supra note 47,
at 65, 68 (“The federal directories consist of information from the state directories and
federal agencies, and are located in the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS).”).
52 42 U.S.C. § 666(f) (2006); Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir.
2000).
53 DOMESTIC RELATIONS, supra note 30, at 262.
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“establishment of paternities, establishment of child support
orders, collections on current child support payments, collections
on past-due child support [payments] (i.e., arrearages), and cost
effectiveness.”54 Under this program, “states receive incentive
payments of 6 [to] 10% of each dollar collected in arrearages and
current amounts owing, as well as two-thirds of states’ collection
costs and 90% of computer costs.”55
In addition, federal law has also expanded the penalties that
states can impose against those parents who fail to meet their
child support obligations. For instance, in 1984 Congress enacted
the Child Support Enforcement Amendments (CSEA), which
required “[s]tates to put teeth into their enforcement laws and
strengthen their enforcement powers.”56 The CSEA compels states
to: “(1) require employers to withhold child support from
paychecks of delinquent parents for one month, (2) provide for the
imposition of liens against the property of defaulting support
obligors, and (3) deduct from federal and state income tax refunds
unpaid support obligations.”57 PRWORA also increased the ways
in which a state can seek to compel payment of child support.
Specifically, “[w]hen a parent fails to pay child support, the
PRWORA requires states to revoke passports, suspend
professional and other licenses, place liens on property, and notify
consumer credit reporting agencies.”58
In thinking about the way in which the laws relating to child
support adjudication and enforcement have developed, it is
important to keep in mind that, despite this evolution, the policies

CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT: CHILD SUPPORT AND BEYOND
22 (Susan Boriotti & Donna Dennis eds., 2003); see also 42 U.S.C. § 658a(b)(6)(A)–(E) (2006)
(establishing state performance levels for incentive payments).
55 Jennifer Goulah, Comment, The Cart Before the Horse: Michigan Jumps the Gun in
Jailing Deadbeat Dads, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 479, 485 (2006).
56 Laura W. Morgan, Child Support Fifty Years Later, 42 FAM. L.Q. 365, 367 (2008)
(citing Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.)).
57 Id.; see also Steven B. Garasky, Wage Withholding: Its Effect on Monthly Child Support
Payments and Its Potential for Making Child Support a Reliable Source of Income, in
REDEFINING FAMILY POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 225, 227 (Joyce M.
Mercier et al eds., 2000) (“Wage withholding has become the primary tool for enforcing child
support orders.”).
58 Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 2000).
54
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driving these enforcement mechanisms have remained the same.59
Thus, to fully understand the nature of child support obligations,
one must not only look to the governing statutes, but also specific
underlying policies: (1) the best interest of the child and (2) the
preservation of public funds.60 The remainder of this Part
discusses each of these motivating influences more fully.
First, when it comes to children, “[i]t is usually in the best
interests of a child and society to have at least two adults
financially responsible for the child’s support.”61 Of course, not
only is such support in the child’s best interest, but in society’s as
well. As Professor Donald C. Hubin explains:
There is a social interest in children’s well-being.
Insofar as one of the objectives of a society is to
“promote the common good,” children’s well-being is,
ipso facto, a societal interest. Furthermore, for a
society to flourish through time, its children must be
raised with love, care[,] and sufficient material
resources for them to flourish as individuals. The
societal costs of children who are raised in abject
poverty without the guidance of loving, involved
parents are high.62
Of course, just because society has an interest in a child’s wellbeing does not necessarily mean that the duty of support should
fall on the child’s parents. We could, for example, craft a legal
system in which the whole community shares these obligations.63
Hatcher, supra note 32, at 1032 (“The current child support system developed from
competing interests and purposes, a mixture of common law, divorce codes, state poor laws,
bastardy acts, and criminal nonsupport statues [sic]. From this history emerged the two
primary interests in child support.”).
60 Id.
61 Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations Between the
Men Involved in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949, 991
(2009); Johnson, supra note 27, at 529 (“This policy of private support is based on the theory
that the best interests of a child are served by receiving support from both of his biological
parents.”).
62 Hubin, supra note 28, at 44.
63 See, e.g., D. MARIANNE BLAIR ET AL., FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW 589 (giving
examples of “communities where communal child-rearing is the norm”).
59
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American law, however, has declined to adopt such an approach.64
Instead, child support law is premised on the “widely held belief
that parents are morally and socially obligated to support their
children.”65 As Sir William Blackstone explained, parents “would
be in the highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only gave
their children life, that they might afterwards see them perish.”66
After all, the child and his attendant needs would not even exist
but for the actions (which are generally voluntary) of the parents.67
Further, the law charges adults with full knowledge of where
babies come from: “Because a woman and a man voluntarily have
sex, and that sex could result in a pregnancy, that woman and
man are responsible for the child.”68 For these reasons, it is
generally accepted that “[a] child’s right to support is owed by the
parents, not the state.”69
The final reason the law refuses to place such responsibility on
the greater community is, as noted earlier, the policy of reducing
demands on public funds.70 For instance, one of the primary
objectives of early bastardy acts was “to protect the public from the
burden of maintaining illegitimate children.”71 Nonetheless, as
Professor Hatcher notes, the state’s desire to provide for its
citizens in need does create a tension “between the societal
64 See Anne Corden & Daniel R. Meyer, Child Support Policy Regimes in the United
States, United Kingdom, and Other Countries: Similar Issues, Different Approaches, 21
FOCUS 72, 75 (2000) (“In all [European countries and the United States], parents who are or
were married to each other are legally obliged to support their children. In the case of
unmarried parents, once paternity is established, the father must also provide financial
support.”).
65 Maureen R. Waller & Walter Plotnick, Effective Child Support Policy for Low-Income
Single Parents, in FOCUS ON SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 271,
271 (Annice D. Yarber & Paul M. Sharp eds., 2010).
66 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447.
67 See Hubin, supra note 28, at 65 (“Typically, fathers and mothers share moral
responsibility for the existence of their children—they voluntarily engage in actions that
they know, or should know, might cause pregnancy.”).
68 Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L.
REV. 649, 664 (2008).
69 City of San Francisco v. Garnett, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 924, 928 (Ct. App. 1999).
70 See supra notes 28, 47–50 and accompanying text.
71 Fiege v. Boehm, 123 A.2d 316, 321 (Md. 1956) (discussing the Maryland Bastardy Act);
see also In re Wheeler, 8 P. 276, 278 (Kan. 1885) (“To compel him to assist in the
maintenance of the fruit of his immoral act, and to indemnify the public against the burden
of supporting the child, is the purpose of the proceeding in bastardy.”).
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interest in supporting children and the simultaneous interest in
protecting society from the burden of supporting children.”72 This
tension is what ultimately led to the current statutory framework
addressing child support obligations. Namely, a parent can obtain
support from the state, but in exchange, must cooperate in the
state’s attempt to recoup those costs from the other parent.73
Although the current system has certainly been criticized in its
overall effectiveness, the underlying goal is to simultaneously
“provide assistance to needy families” and “encourage the
formation and maintenance of two-parent families,”74 while also
recouping welfare costs.75
III. APPLICATION OF THE STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD: MALE
VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
As discussed above, the fact that it is typically in children’s best
interest to receive financial support from mothers as well as fathers
serves as the basis for much of the law relating to child support. As
Professor Hubin describes: “The obligation to financially support a
child is one of the elements in the ‘normative bundle’ of paternity—
the bundle of rights and responsibilities typically associated with
this concept.”76 So strong is this precept that courts will hold a
father liable for child support even in the face of wrongful conduct
by the mother. As one court succinctly put it: “The mother’s alleged
fault or wrongful conduct is irrelevant.”77 Thus, child support is
Hatcher, supra note 32, at 1035.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
74 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2006).
Other goals listed in the statute include: ending “the
dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work,
and marriage”; preventing and reducing “the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies[;] and
establish[ing] annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these
pregnancies.” Id.
75 See Hatcher, supra note 32, at 1086 (“Two of the primary purposes of the TANF
welfare program are encouraging the ‘formation and maintenance’ of two-parent families
and helping families to achieve economic self-sufficiency. However, welfare cost recovery—
also a centerpiece of welfare policy—undermines both TANF goals.”).
76 See Hubin, supra note 28, at 61.
77 State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Kan. 1993) (quoting Weinberg
v. Omar E., 482 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541 (1984)); see also S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d
1186, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (“[A]ny wrongful conduct on the part of the mother should
not alter the father’s duty to provide support for the child.”).
72
73

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1761333

2012]

FATHERHOOD BY CONSCRIPTION

421

essentially a form of strict liability justified because “the child is an
innocent party, and . . . the child’s interests and welfare” are what
the court must look to in adjudicating support.78
To see this principle in action, consider the issue of paternity
fraud,79 whereby a mother secures child support payments from a
man after intentionally lying to him and telling him that he is the
child’s father.80 Despite this deception and the resulting financial
burden, these “fathers,” even after learning that they are not the
child’s biological parent, are nonetheless often ordered to continue
paying child support on the basis that doing so is in the child’s best
interest.81 Thus, if open misrepresentation of paternity by the
Hubin, supra note 28, at 55 (quoting S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1189).
Professor Melanie Jacobs, who has written extensively on the subject of paternity
fraud, offers the following explanation of the term: “[W]ith the improvement of DNA testing,
a growing number of men who previously thought they had a biological connection to a child
they have helped to raise and/or for whom they were adjudicated father have learned that
they are not biologically related to their children.” Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads:
Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 837 (2006).
80 Although this extreme example of maternal misconduct is used here to highlight just
how strict liability can be for child support, paternity fraud claims may not always involve
intentional deception by a mother. As Professor Jacobs explains:
Though used by courts, legislatures, newspersons, and others, at its core
the term [paternity fraud] embraces an often-incorrect assumption: a
devious and fraudulent act by the child’s mother. In paternity fraud cases,
the legal father typically portrays the mother as a scheming Jezebel who
set out to trick, dupe, and deceive the man she falsely named as the child’s
father. And many people reading articles about “duped dads” feel
sympathy for a man who was so wronged. But the scheming Jezebel
scenario . . . is not always true. A pregnant woman having an extramarital
affair, for instance, may not know which man is the biological father. If her
marriage is back on track, she may not wish to rock the boat and damage
her family further by revealing the affair. In the paternity context, some
women may not know which man is the biological father of their child but
must name a man in order to qualify for governmental benefits. The issue
is much more complicated than a bad girl, good guy scenario.
Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn’t Want to Be Daddy Anymore: An Argument Against
Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193, 196 (2004).
81 For example, the Supreme Court of Vermont, in denying one father’s request for
paternity disestablishment, pointed to the “many jurisdictions holding that the financial
and emotional welfare of the child, and the preservation of an established parent–child
relationship, must remain paramount.” Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910 (Vt. 1998).
Following those cases, the court ruled that “absent a clear and convincing showing that it
would serve the best interests of the child, a prior adjudication of paternity is conclusive.”
Id.; see also Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 871 (W. Va. 1989) (“Even if blood test
evidence excludes paternity in a given case, the trial judge should refuse to permit blood
test evidence which would disprove paternity when the individual attempting to
78
79
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mother offers little defense to child support liability, one can
imagine how limited a defense is available to a man who is the
biological father. In that case, “[s]o long as a man engages in an
intimate sexual act resulting in his depositing of his sperm with a
woman who then becomes pregnant, he is liable for child
support.”82
At first glance, such a standard seems eminently reasonable.
Few would argue with the proposition that if a man voluntarily
has sex with a woman and a child results, then he should be liable
for child support. The problem with the current approach,
however, is that the standard is so strict that even those men who
never consented to the sexual act that caused the pregnancy are
nonetheless liable for support. As one commentator describes,
“[w]hile courts have declared that child support obligations are
dependent on voluntary parenthood, they are often reluctant to
look to consent for guidance.”83 Professor Hubin goes even further,
pointing out that, under contemporary legal standards, it has
become a “settled approach” that “genetic relationships establish
legal paternity regardless of whether the genetic fathers gave legal
consent, or were capable of giving legal consent, to an act of sexual
intercourse that resulted in the pregnancies.”84
The purpose of this Part, then, is to illustrate the degree to
which courts routinely reject consent as a defense to child support
obligations. In so doing, the Part will look to two categories of
child support cases in which this issue arises: (1) cases involving a
minor who became a father as a result of being statutorily raped
and (2) cases where a woman used a man’s sperm to impregnate
herself without his consent.

disestablish paternity has held himself out to be the father of the child for a sufficient
period of time such that disproof of paternity would result in undeniable harm to the
child.”).
82 Laura Wish Morgan, It’s Ten O’Clock: Do You Know Where Your Sperm Are? Toward a
Strict Liability Theory of Parentage, SUPPORT GUIDELINES (Jan. 1, 2002, 9:12 PM), http://
www.childsupportguidelines.com/articles/art199903.html.
83 Johnson, supra note 27, at 535.
84 Hubin, supra note 28, at 55.
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A. STATUTORY RAPE

State legislatures, understanding that most adolescents lack
full emotional, mental, and physical maturity, are rightly
concerned with protecting teens from “unequal, manipulative, or
predatory relationships.”85 One of the primary ways in which
legislatures attempt to accomplish this goal is through statutory
rape laws, which in essence, criminalize sexual activity with a
child younger than the statutorily defined age of consent.86 Thus,
age of consent laws, which vary by state, lay out the minimum age
at which a person can legally consent to engage in a sexual act.87
In most instances,88 engaging in a sexual act with someone below
the age of consent is a criminal act, given that the child was
incapable of legally consenting.89 As one commentator describes:
“The law conceives of the younger partner as categorically
incompetent to say either yes or no to sex. Because she is by
definition powerless both personally and legally to resist or to
voluntarily relinquish her ‘virtue,’ the state, which sees its interest
in guarding that virtue, resists for her.”90 In most states, the
offense of statutory rape is a felony.91
85 CAROLYN COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES 2 (2004).
86 ROBERT L. MADDEX, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 274–75 (2006).
87 Id. at 275; see also Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the
Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 334 (2003) (“At its most basic,
statutory rape is the carnal knowledge of a person who is deemed underage as proscribed by
statute and who is therefore presumed to be incapable of consenting to sexual activity.”
(footnotes omitted)).
88 One notable exception involves a married couple. See generally Kelly C. Connerton,
The Resurgence of the Marital Rape Exemption: The Victimization of Teens by Their
Statutory Rapists, 61 ALB. L. REV. 237, 251 (1997) (examining the history of the marital
rape exemption and how the exemption “continues to excuse the rape of young women and
make the prosecution of marital rapists under state statutory rape laws impossible”).
89 MADDEX, supra note 86, at 275.
90 JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEX
71 (2002). Interestingly enough, the original impetus behind statutory rape laws was the
property interest that fathers had in their daughters’ chastity. See MARY E. ODOM,
DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING AND POLICING AGAINST ADOLESCENT FEMALE
SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1885–1920, at 71 (1995) (“They saw the law as a tool to
be used not so much to protect women from sexual harm as to protect the interests of
fathers, future husbands, and the state.”).
91 Michael J. Higdon, Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies: The Cruel and Invidious
Discrimination Behind Heterosexist Statutory Rape Laws, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 225 (2008).
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Aside from the criminal penalty, however, there arises the
question of whether a male victim of statutory rape should be
liable for child support payments should the rape result in a child.
Unfortunately, this issue arises somewhat frequently. Indeed,
there are “numerous cases in which an adult woman became
pregnant as a result of sexual relations she initiated with a minor
child.”92 Nonetheless, despite the number of times this question
has arisen, every single court has answered it in the affirmative—
holding that, yes, the minor father is liable.93 To understand the
courts’ rationale, consider again the story of Nathaniel, mentioned
at the beginning of this article.
In that case, Nathaniel, who was fifteen at the time, and the
mother Ricci Jones, who was thirty-four, engaged in sexual
intercourse, which Nathaniel described as “a mutually agreeable
act.”94 Nonetheless, by having sexual relations with Nathaniel,
Jones violated California law, which states that “[a]ny person over
the age of [twenty-one] years who engages in an act of unlawful
sexual intercourse with a minor who is under [sixteen] years of age
is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony.”95 As a result, Jones
was prosecuted and convicted of statutory rape.96 Subsequently,
however, the district attorney’s office brought an action against
Nathaniel, seeking child support and welfare reimbursement.97
After the trial court reserved an order of child support, Nathaniel
appealed, arguing that “exacting child support from a victim of
statutory rape violates public policy” in that “public policy protects
[minors] from the effects of sexual exploitation by [adults].”98
The court, however, flatly rejected Nathaniel’s arguments. The
court began its analysis by noting that “California law provides

92 Hubin, supra note 28, at 51; see also id. at n.93 (listing cases); Jones, supra note 27, at
416 n.23 (same).
93 See Jones, supra note 27, at 412.
94 Cnty. of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 843–44 (Ct. App. 1996).
95 Id. at 843 n.1 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(d)).
96 Id. at 844 (“The San Luis Obispo County prosecutor prosecuted Jones and obtained a
conviction of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor.”).
97 Id.
98 Id. Further, Nathaniel argued that “the reserved child support order ‘is exactly the
exploitation which the Legislature intended to prevent’ because it inflicts economic loss on a
crime victim.” Id.
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that every child has a right to support from both parents.”99 The
court then refused to release Nathaniel from liability because, as
the court concluded, “he is not an innocent victim of Jones’s
criminal acts.”100 Indeed, the court noted that “ ‘[t]here is an
important distinction between a party who is injured through no
fault of his or her own and an injured party who willingly
participated in the offense about which a complaint is made.’ ”101
The court placed Nathaniel in the latter category given that he
voluntarily engaged in sexual intercourse with Jones: “It does not
necessarily follow that a minor over the age of [fourteen] who
voluntarily engages in sexual intercourse is a victim of sexual
abuse.”102 Paradoxically, then, the court held that Nathaniel was
liable for child support because he voluntarily engaged in sexual
intercourse despite the fact he was a minor at the time of
conception and, thus, legally could not consent to sexual relations.
The Nathaniel case is no anomaly; indeed, every court to
consider the issue of whether a male victim of statutory rape is
liable for child support has reached the same conclusion, using the
same reasoning.103 For instance, in holding that the father was
liable for child support, despite the fact that he was only fourteen
years of age at the time of conception, the Court of Appeals of
Michigan in L.M.E. v. A.R.S. stated as follows: “[the father]
participated in the act of sexual intercourse that resulted in the
conception of [the child] . . . [and] is not absolved from the
responsibility to support the child because [the mother] was
technically committing an act of criminal sexual conduct.”104
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Kansas in State ex rel.
Hermesmann v. Seyer held that the father, who was only twelve
Id.
Id. Specifically, the court noted that “[a]fter discussing the matter, he and Jones
decided to have sexual relations. They had sexual intercourse approximately five times
over a two week period.” Id.
101 Id. (quoting Cynthia M. v. Rodney E., 279 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98 (Ct. App. 1991)). According
to the court, it then followed that “[o]ne who is injured as a result of criminal conduct in
which he willingly participated is not a typical crime victim.” Id.
102 Id. (citation omitted).
103 See Jones, supra note 27, at 412 (“Without exception, appellate courts have held that
while the criminal law deems minors incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse, family
law can hold victims financially liable for children conceived during a criminal act.”).
104 680 N.W.2d 902, 914 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis added).
99

100
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years old at the time of conception, was nonetheless liable for child
support:
This State’s interest in requiring minor parents to
support their children overrides the State’s competing
interest in protecting juveniles from improvident acts,
even when such acts may include criminal activity on
the part of the other parent . . . . This minor child, the
only truly innocent party, is entitled to support from
both her parents regardless of their ages.105
Similarly, in In re Paternity of JLH, the Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin rejected the claim that a fifteen-year-old should be
relieved of child support obligations given that he was the victim of
sexual assault: “If voluntary intercourse results in parenthood,
then for purposes of child support, the parenthood is voluntary.
This is true even if a fifteen-year old [sic] boy’s parenthood
resulted from a sexual assault upon him within the meaning of the
criminal law.”106
Again, these represent a small sampling of the many cases in
which courts have ordered victims of statutory rape to pay child
support to a child who was conceived as a result of a sexual act to
which the victim was legally incapable of consenting.
B. “STOLEN” SPERM

Male victims of statutory rape are not the only men who,
despite not having consented to a sexual act, have nonetheless
been held liable for the support of the resulting child. After all,
“the absence of consent need not result from force or coercion; it
may also result from some form of ignorance or incapacity.”107
Thus, included in this category of “fathers” are also those men who
have had their sperm taken and used for conception without their
consent.
To illustrate, consider again the stories from the
beginning of this article concerning S.F. and Emile.
847 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Kan. 1993).
441 N.W.2d 273, 276–77 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
107 Hubin, supra note 28, at 66 (citing Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory
Overview and Proposals for Reform, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 133 (2002)).
105
106
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S.F. was the Alabama gentleman who passed out in a bed at
T.M.’s—the eventual mother’s—house while attending a party.108
He awoke the next day and noticed that his clothes had been
removed.109 In the ensuing months, T.M. bragged to friends and
acquaintances that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with
S.F. while he was unconscious and, thus, in her words, S.F. had
“saved her a trip to the sperm bank.”110 A child resulted from the
incident, and in 1994, the State of Alabama, on behalf of T.M.,
brought an action against S.F. to collect child support.111 The
lower court entered a judgment against S.F., requiring him to pay
$106.04 a week and also $8,960.64 in arrears.112
On appeal, S.F. argued that the court should relieve him of
liability given that “he did not have consensual intercourse with
T.M. and that he was a victim of a sexual assault by T.M.”113
According to S.F., “to require him to support the child that
resulted from this nonconsensual intercourse would be to punish
him, to deprive him of his property rights, and to deny him equal
protection under the law.”114 The court, however, rejected S.F.’s
argument: “The child is an innocent party . . . . [A]ny wrongful
conduct on the part of the mother should not alter the father’s
duty to provide support for the child.”115 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on support cases where the child was a
product of statutory rape.116 However, the court also relied on a
S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
Id. According to S.F., although he had been clothed when he passed out, “when he
awoke the following morning he was wearing only his unbuttoned shirt and . . . T.M. was
standing in the bathroom doorway ‘toweling off.’ ” Id.
110 Id. at 1188. Dr. Lane Layton, an expert witness, “testified that it was her medical
opinion that a man who is intoxicated to the point of losing consciousness is physically
capable of having an erection and ejaculation.” Id.
111 Id. at 1186.
112 Id. The trial court also ordered S.F. “to include the child on his medical insurance; to
pay one-half of any medical expenses not covered by insurance; and to pay $300 for the cost
of the blood tests.” Id. at 1186–87.
113 Id. at 1188.
114 Id.
S.F. “further contended that the court, acting in equity, could abate any child
support payments due because of what he alleged to be T.M.’s sexual assault upon him.” Id.
at 1187.
115 Id. at 1189 (noting also that the purpose of the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act “is to
provide for the general welfare of the child”).
116 Id. (citing Mercer Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 288 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1992) and State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993)).
108
109
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case where the mother lied to the father about being on birth
control and, as a result of that misrepresentation, the father
engaged in sexual intercourse with the mother.117 In all such
cases, the courts have held that the father was liable for child
support despite the mother’s false statement.118
Similar to S.F., in In re Paternity of Daniel S.H., a Wisconsin
father, Daniel, claimed that the mother, Jennifer, engaged in
nonconsensual sexual intercourse with him after lacing his drink
with “a date rape drug.”119 In an action to collect child support for
the resulting child (a son named Derek), the lower court allowed
Daniel to introduce evidence of nonconsent.120 Even so, the court
placed the burden of proof on Daniel, requiring him “to prove all
factual issues by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.”121
Ultimately, “[t]he jury found that Daniel’s sexual intercourse with
Jennifer was involuntary.”122 Nevertheless, the lower court still
required Daniel to pay child support.123 On appeal, Daniel argued
that the lower court’s order was in error and that “the jury’s
finding of lack of consent should bar or reduce his child support
obligation.”124
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, however, agreed with the
lower court because “[t]he paramount goal of any child support
decision is to secure the best interests of the child”125 and that, in
this case, “Derek was not at fault” and thus “was entitled to
Id. (citing L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1983)).
See Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies, and the Duty to Disclose, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 891–92
(2005) (summarizing courts’ approaches to cases where one partner did not disclose or
misrepresented his or her fertility status); J. Terrell Mann, Note, Misrepresentation of
Sterility or Use of Birth Control, 26 J. FAM. L. 623, 631–34 (1988) (collecting cases holding
fathers liable for financial support despite their partners’ misrepresentations).
119 In re Paternity of Derek S.H., 642 N.W.2d 645, No. 01-0473, 2002 WL 265006, at *1
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2002) (unpublished table decision).
120 Notably, “[t]he trial court barred Daniel from introducing evidence of his nonconsent as a
defense to paternity. The court stated that Daniel’s allegation was not a defense to paternity,
but that the issue could be considered for purposes of establishing child support.” Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. The jury’s special verdicts appear inconsistent. Despite finding that the act of
intercourse was involuntary, the jury found “that Jennifer did not give him a drug causing
him to have involuntary sex with her.” Id.
123 Id. Specifically, the court ordered Daniel to pay child support in the amount of $100
per week. Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at *2 (citing Luciani v. Montemurro-Luciani, 544 N.W.2d 561, 572 (Wis. 1996)).
117
118
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receive child support from both parents.”126 Despite agreeing with
the lower court’s determination of child support, the Court of
Appeals nonetheless disagreed with the lower court putting the
issue of consent to the jury.127 Specifically, the Court of Appeals
found no statutory basis for permitting a jury to consider consent
when ruling on the issue of child support.128 Instead, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the only real question the jury had to answer
was whether Daniel was the father: “Daniel had a right to have a
jury decide whether he is Derek’s father. However, Daniel admitted
he was Derek’s father. As a result, a judgment of paternity was
entered. When the court determined that Daniel was Derek’s
father, Daniel’s right to a jury trial was extinguished.”129
A final example of stolen sperm is that of Emile, discussed in
the introduction to this Article.130 His story is somewhat different,
however, in that Emile did consent to sexual activity with the
mother.131 Nonetheless, Emile claimed that he merely consented
to oral sex with the mother and never consented to her use of his
sperm for purposes of self-insemination.132 In that case, from midAugust to early September of 1983, Emile was visiting his parents
in a hospital when Debra Rojas, a nurse, offered to perform oral
sex on him provided that he wore a condom.133 Emile consented to
the sex act but claimed that subsequently Debra had, without
Emile’s knowledge or consent, used Emile’s sperm to successfully
impregnate herself.134 Nearly ten years later, the state filed an

Id.
Id. at *3.
128 Id. (analyzing WIS. STAT. § 767.50(1)).
129 Id. (citations omitted).
130 See supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text.
131 State v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (La. Ct. App. 1997). Emile testified that one
evening “this woman came upon me in the waiting room and she told me that she wanted to
perform oral sex on me” and “as being any male would, I did not refuse . . . .” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
132 Id. According to Emile, Debra, the child’s mother, asked him to wear a condom as a
condition to providing him with oral sex, “but he denied having any knowledge of what she
planned to do with the sperm.” Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1035 (“Several months later, plaintiff started insinuating that he might be the
father of her child, and although he did not personally see her do it, he believed that she
may have inseminated herself.”).
126
127
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action against Emile to collect child support.135 Despite his
objections, the lower court ordered Emile to pay $436.81 per
month, $17,909.21 in arrears, and 5% court costs.136
The Court of Appeals of Louisiana affirmed, stating that “[t]he
fact of paternity obliges a father to support his child.”137 The court
then recounted the story of how Debra had allegedly impregnated
herself without Emile’s consent. The allegation notwithstanding,
the court held that “the evidence presented clearly supported [the
trial judge’s] determination that defendant is the father of the
minor child.”138 Further, the court noted that paternity testing
revealed a 99.9994% probability that Emile was the father.139
Finally, in addressing the issue of Debra’s self-insemination
without Emile’s consent, the court dismissed the point, merely
noting that “[Emile’s] own testimony showed that he had some sort
of sexual contact with the plaintiff around the time frame of
alleged conception.”140 The fact that any sexual contact occurred
was sufficient to hold Emile liable for child support.
An appellate court in Illinois reached a similar result in Phillips
v. Irons.141 In that case, Dr. Richard Phillips and Dr. Sharon Irons
began a dating relationship, during which time the couple engaged
in oral sex on three occasions.142 The two never had sexual
intercourse because Irons told Phillips that she was menstruating
and thus needed to refrain from vaginal intercourse.143
Nonetheless, Phillips alleged that, unbeknownst to him, Irons
used Phillips’s semen (obtained from oral sex) to successfully

Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1033–34.
137 Id. at 1034 (citing Dubroc v. Dubroc, 388 So. 2d 377 (La. 1980)).
138 Id. at 1035.
This evidence consisted of “plaintiff’s affidavit in which she named
defendant as the father of the child,” her admission “she had sexual intercourse with him in
September 1983, and further claimed that she did not have sexual intercourse with any
other man thirty days prior to or . . . after the date of conception.” Id.
139 Id. at 1035–36.
140 Id. at 1036 (emphasis added).
141 No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005).
142 Id.
143 Id. Further, “[d]uring their relationship, the parties discussed the possibility of having
children only after they married. Plaintiff informed defendant he did not wish to have
children prior to marriage, and intended to use a condom if and when they engaged in
sexual intercourse.” Id.
135
136
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Subsequently, Irons gave birth to a
inseminate herself.144
daughter and, soon thereafter, filed a “Petition to Establish
Paternity and Other Relief ” against Phillips.145 Because he had
ended the relationship with Irons over a year prior, Phillips had no
knowledge of Irons’s pregnancy or the birth of the child.146
Nonetheless, DNA testing proved that Phillips was the biological
father.147 Ignoring the deceptive manner in which the child was
conceived, the court awarded child support to Irons in the amount
of $800 a month, which was later increased to $1,600 a month.148
In sum, in cases involving a father who claims that the mother
stole his sperm, whether this “theft” occurred during
nonconsensual intercourse or by the mother harvesting the sperm
from sexual activity other than intercourse and then
surreptitiously using for insemination, the result is the same: the
lack of consent is no bar to an obligation to pay child support. In
other words, “[i]f a man intends to have sexual [relations] with a
woman and a baby results, the man is liable for child support. The
sexual [relations] in these cases is ‘factually voluntary’ and thus
intentional, even if it is nonconsensual in the criminal sense.”149
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH STRICT LIABILITY
The practice of holding male victims of sexual assault liable for
child support is problematic for a number of reasons. Before
getting into these problems, however, it is important to note at
least one very strong reason for preserving a strict liability
approach to adjudicating child support claims. Namely, doing so
makes the process of securing child support that much simpler.150
144 Id. (“On or around February 19, 1999, and March 19, 1999, defendant ‘intentionally
engaged in oral sex with [plaintiff] so that she could harvest [his] semen and artificially
inseminate herself,’ and ‘did artificially inseminate herself.’ ” (quoting Phillips’ complaint)).
145 Id.
146 Id. Phillips ended the relationship after learning that Irons was, in fact, still married
to her first husband. Id.
147 Id.
148 Chris Hack, Man Claiming Stolen Sperm Ordered to Double Child Support, CHI. SUN
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2005, at 24.
149 See Morgan, supra note 82.
150 See, e.g., Amy G. Langerman & Richard W. Langerman, Arizona Insurance Bad Faith
and the Doctrine of Strict Liability, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 349, 364 (1990) (“Strict liability creates

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1761333

432

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:407

Without a bright-line rule, courts would be required to expend a
considerable amount of judicial resources on what could easily
become endless litigation over whether making the biological
father pay child support is equitable.151 Such justifications,
however, are not without limits. As one commentator aptly put it,
“[i]t seems far better to protect the rights of the few than to make
a blanket ruling where the rights of those few are brushed aside in
the name of efficient court dockets.”152
Regardless, some may argue that the strict liability approach is
not just driven by judicial economy, but also the importance of
securing child support payments for needy children.153 In the
context of male victims of sexual assault, however, this
justification is not only misleading but somewhat myopic since
holding these victims liable for child support creates a number of
problems. The remainder of this Part discusses each of those
problems in turn.
A. STRICT LIABILITY MISCHARACTERIZES THE ISSUE

The question the courts should be asking in the cases discussed
above154 is not whether receiving support from both parents is the
child’s best interest but, given the way child support laws
operate,155 whether the child’s best interest is served by having the
victimized parent reimburse the state for payments the state has
made on behalf of the child.156 After all, “the child’s rights in these
cases have actually been relinquished to the government, since
certainty and is simple to apply.”).
151 See id. (“Strict liability would significantly reduce litigation.”).
152 Nancy S. McCahan, Comment, Justice Scalia’s Constitutional Trinity: Originalism,
Traditionalism and the Rule of Law as Reflected in His Dissent in O’Hare and Umbehr, 41
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1435, 1463–64 (1997).
153 See supra notes 60–69 and accompanying text.
154 See supra Part III.
155 See supra Part II.
156 Jones, supra note 27, at 449–50; see also Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family
Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 259 (2000) (noting that federal laws relating the
establishment of paternity “were not motivated[ ] by the belief that children deserve to
know who their absent fathers are or that child support might lead to a more secure bond
between these children and their noncustodial fathers. . . . [Instead,] [s]tates want to
establish paternity to identify a child support obligor so that they can collect support
payments to offset the costs of welfare payments.”).
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these cases arise when a county seeks repayment of public benefits
paid on behalf of the child.”157 When one phrases the question this
way, the best interest argument loses a lot of steam. Further,
even if the state is unable to collect child support from the
victimized father, “the child will likely continue to receive benefits
from the state.”158 As one commentator describes, “[t]he only way
a child can actually financially benefit from the state successfully
seeking and obtaining reimbursements from the victimized father
is in a situation where the father pays more in child support than
the state pays in welfare benefits on behalf of the child.”159
Accordingly, the state—and not the child—is the one most in
danger of harm should the state be unable to collect support
payments from the victimized father.
B. STRICT LIABILITY PLACES RESPONSIBILITY ON THE WRONG PARTY

Typically, “[a] child’s right to support is owned by anyone the
government can somehow make pay, not the state.”160 Yet, simply
because a child has a right to support does not necessarily tell us
who is liable for that support.161 As Professor Hubin rightfully
points out, “[t]he existence of a positive right to education, for
instance, does not establish any particular person has the
obligation to provide this education; this obligation could fall on all
of society collectively.”162 In the cases discussed in Part II, by
holding those men liable for child support, the courts, in essence,
punish the victims for being victimized. But if anyone is to be
blamed in these cases, it is the state.
After all, as Professor Ruth Jones points out, “[e]very state has
a law authorizing compensation for crime victims, indicating that
legislatures do not believe these persons should have to bear the
financial costs of their victimization.”163 Such compensation has
Jones, supra note 27, at 449.
Johnson, supra note 27, at 530.
159 Id. at 530–31 (noting that “[a] child is not likely to benefit in this way because statistics
show that children born to poor mothers usually have poor biological fathers as well”).
160 Morgan, supra note 82.
161 Hubin, supra note 28, at 56.
162 See id. (“A further argument is necessary to determine who has the obligation to
provide a person with something to which she has a positive right.”).
163 See Jones, supra note 27, at 456; see also STEVEN E. BARKAN & GEORGE J. BRYJAK,
157
158
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“been justified by the failure of the state to protect its citizens from
crime, by the ‘shared risk’ theory in which all citizens share the
cost and risk of victimization, and by the ‘moral obligation’ theory,
in which the state has a moral responsibility toward crime
victims.”164 Although the number of children in need of financial
assistance who are fathered by men as a result of sexual assault is
unclear, putting the burden on the state to contribute support to
those children would stop punishing the victims and provide the
state with a greater incentive to better address the problem of
male sexual assault.
C. STRICT LIABILITY TRIVIALIZES SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST MEN

In holding that a fifteen-year-old victim of statutory rape was
liable for child support, the judge in the Nathaniel case made a
very telling statement: “Victims have rights. Here, the victim also
has responsibilities.”165 That quote is emblematic of the glaring
lack of concern that child support law currently has for the male
victims of sexual assault. Now, it seems to be generally accepted
that, when compared to women, it is much rarer for a man to be
the victim of sexual assault.166 As such, fewer studies have been
conducted on the impact sexual assault has on men.167
Nonetheless, at least some data exists, albeit limited, on the effect
statutory rape has on young men. For example, as psychology
professor Roger J.R. Levesque describes, “for boys, a largely
excluded group from discussions of the negative impact of early
FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW 175 (2d ed. 2011) (“Every
state has a crime victims compensation program that it administers independently.”).
164 See Jones, supra note 27, at 456 (citing Lesley J. Friedsam, Legislative Assistance to
Victims of Crime: The Florida Crimes Compensation Act, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 862–63
(1984)).
165 Cnty. of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 843 (Ct. App. 1996).
166 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e believe that many
women share common concerns which men do not necessarily share. . . . Men, who are rarely
victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of
the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive.”).
167 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 27, at 439 (“In contrast to the steps taken to study and
address female victimization, male victimization has not been adequately studied.”); see also
15 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts § 259 n.1 (1992) (“This article refers to the victim of sexual
assault in the feminine gender because there is very little medical research regarding the
effect of sexual assault on male victims.”).
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sexual activity, research indicates that males pay an emotional
price for beginning a sexual relationship early.”168 Specifically, a
study of male statutory rape victims revealed that the rape
impacted their attendance at school, led to drug and alcohol abuse,
and increased the likelihood that the young men would engage in
criminal activity.169
When courts force these victims to assume financial
responsibility for the child resulting from a sexual assault, the
courts not only devalue these harms, they likely exacerbate them.
As Professor Jones points out, “[b]y imposing financial
responsibility to repay state support for an unplanned child,”170
the law magnifies the harm to statutory rape victims. It fails to
protect them from “the long-term, negative consequences resulting
from the financial obligations of fatherhood.”171 These obligations,
of course, have quite an impact on any male, whether he be a child
or an adult at the time a court orders him to pay child support.
After all, in many ways, “[t]he imposition of a child-support award
is considered to be the equivalent of an eighteen-year sentence.”172
Yet, when a court forces a male to pay child support as a
consequence of having been sexually assaulted, the resulting
obligation does not only impose financial hardship but, in many
ways, compounds his victimization.
D. STRICT LIABILITY RELIES ON IMPERMISSIBLE GENDER
STEREOTYPES

In her book, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other
Twentieth Century Tragedies, Professor Martha Albertson
Fineman points out that “[w]hile the dominant aspirational story
168 ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, ADOLESCENTS, SEX, AND THE LAW: PREPARING ADOLESCENTS FOR
RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP 76 (2000). Likewise, Levesque points out that “[e]arly sexual
activity brings a host of health hazards as well,” including sexually transmitted diseases. Id.
169 Jones, supra note 27, at 439 (citing NEV. PUB. HEALTH FOUND., ENFORCING STATUTORY
RAPE IN NEVADA 16 (2000)).
170 Id. at 413.
171 Id. at 412; see also Robert I. Lerman, Employment Patterns of Unwed Fathers and
Public Policy, in YOUNG UNWED FATHERS: CHANGING ROLES AND EMERGING POLICIES 316,
317–24 (Robert I. Lerman & Theodora J. Ooms eds., 1993) (noting the adverse effects on
earning capacity that fatherhood poses for young men).
172 FINEMAN, supra note 31, at 212.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1761333

436

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:407

for the past decades has been one of spousal ‘equality,’ great
gender inequality in the allocation of the burdens and costs
associated with family operation continues to affect how this story
is played out in real lives.”173 The current approach to child
support adjudication is a prime example of the inequality to which
Fineman refers.
Indeed, the few commentators who have
criticized the court’s current approach of holding male victims
liable for child support have done so primarily based on the way in
which the current approach violates gender equality.174 Ellen
London’s commentary is particularly instructive:
The traditional conceptions of power, dominance, and
victimization employed by these courts precluded the
judges from providing the defendants with a fair or
adequate solution. Little doubt exists that the judges
in these cases would have written different opinions if
the victims were female—illuminating how men are
viewed as the responsible party in a sexual encounter
and women have no corresponding agency.175
In fact, consider the one case in which a court was called upon to
decide whether a female victim of sexual assault was liable for
child support.176 In DCSE/Esther M.C. v. Mary L., a mother
refused to provide support for her three minor children on the
basis that they were “the result of an incestuous relationship with
her brother,” and, as such, “it was not a voluntary decision on her
part to have the minor children.”177 In ruling, the court did what

173 Id. at 164; see also Kathleen E. Mahoney, Gender and the Judiciary: Confronting
Gender Bias, in GENDER EQUALITY AND THE JUDICIARY: USING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS STANDARDS TO PROMOTE THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND THE GIRL-CHILD AT
THE NATIONAL LEVEL 85, 94 (Kirstine Adams & Andrew Byrnes eds., 1999) (“In family law,
gender bias exists in underlying assumptions and stereotypes which affect alimony,
maintenance, child support and custody awards.”).
174 See Jones, supra note 27, at 419–48 (discussing the gendered aspects of statutory rape
and child support laws); see also London, supra note 27, at 1958 (“[T]he use of strict liability
has problematic implications for societal conceptions of gender.”).
175 London, supra note 27, at 1972.
176 DCSE/Esther M.C. v. Mary L., No. 38812, 1994 WL 811732 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 3,
1994).
177 Id. at *1.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1761333

2012]

FATHERHOOD BY CONSCRIPTION

437

no court has ever done when confronted with the child support
obligations of a male victim of sexual assault—the court ruled that
the mother may not be liable.178 According to the court, “[i]f the
sexual intercourse which results in the birth of a child is
involuntary or without actual consent, a mother may have ‘just
cause’ . . . for failing or refusing to support such a child.”179 The
result in that case is instructive, offering considerable support to
London’s prediction concerning the role that gender likely plays in
these determinations.
Regardless, any case that holds a victim of sexual assault liable
for child support—whether that victim is male or female—should
“lead one to challenge the applicability of the strict liability
theory”180 given the questions such cases raise concerning both
“the feminist ideals of bodily integrity, consent, and sexual
autonomy”181 and “the conception of gender as a fluid and socially
constructed category.”182 For these reasons, London ends her
critique with a call to action, noting that “[f]eminists and others
concerned with gender” are the ones who “will have to ensure that
the legal system is forced to answer”183 the troubling gender
questions raised by these cases. According to London, “[t]o
concentrate on male victims is not to abandon feminism; rather it
is to take a much-needed step toward a more effective
understanding of equality and sex.”184

178 Id. at *3. Although the court suggested that there would be no liability in the face of
nonconsent, based on the facts before it, the court could not “make a summary decision as to
whether this case falls within the rape/incest exception” and thus ordered a future hearing
on that issue. Id.
179 Id. (emphasis added).
180 London, supra note 27, at 1980.
181 Id.; see also Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary,
and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 196–97 (1995) (noting the importance feminist
work has played in the areas of “women’s bodily integrity and decisional autonomy”).
182 London, supra note 27, at 1981.
183 Id. at 1993.
184 Id.; see also Martha T. McCluskey, Fear of Feminism: Media Stories of Feminist
Victims and Victims of Feminism on College Campuses, in FEMINISM, MEDIA, AND THE LAW
57, 71 (Martha A. Fineman & Martha T. McCluskey eds., 1997) (“Though feminists should
continue to speak out about gendered oppression, and though we should question many of
those who claim to be victimized by feminist reforms, we should strive for solutions that will
create fewer victims.”).
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E. STRICT LIABILITY IGNORES MALE REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE

Despite the desire for gender equality, the inescapable fact is
that “men and women play undeniably unequal roles in
reproduction.”185 Specifically, when it comes to guarding against
fatherhood, a male can only exercise that option at the time of
conception.186 Indeed, should he elect to engage in sexual relations
with a female and a baby results, he will be strictly liable for child
support.187 A female, on the other hand, can later elect to abort
the child or give the child up for adoption, thus terminating her
parental rights.188 In contrast, a father cannot make those choices
absent the cooperation of the mother. Thus, when a court holds a
male victim of sexual assault liable for the support of the resulting
child, it effectively strips him of all reproductive choice, a result
which not only goes against feminist principles of bodily
autonomy,189 but arguably may also unconstitutionally infringe on
the right to reproductive autonomy as developed by the Supreme
Court.190 As one commentator has noted, “[t]he decision not to
reproduce is no less fundamental than the decision to reproduce or

185 Sherry F. Colb, Words that Deny, Devalue, and Punish: Judicial Responses to FetusEnvy?, 72 B.U. L. REV. 101, 103 (1992); see also Jones, supra note 27, at 443 (noting “the
differing reproductive roles of men and women”).
186 See Angela Thompson, International Protection of Women’s Rights: An Analysis of
Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre v. Ireland, 12 B.U. INT’L L.J.
371, 393 (1994) (“As a direct consequence of biological differences, reproductive choice is a
right exclusive to women.”).
187 See supra Part III.
188 Vernellia R. Randall & Tshaka C. Randall, Built in Obsolescence: The Coming End to
the Abortion Debate, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 291, 305 (2008) (“Up until this point, a
woman’s reproductive interest has consistently prevailed over the man’s, not because the
law gave greater protection to the woman’s reproductive interest, but because the woman’s
autonomy interest gave her decisions regarding reproduction primacy.”).
189 See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text.
190 See Stephanie Ridder & Lisa Woll, Transforming the Grounds: Autonomy and
Reproductive Freedom, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 89 (1989) (“The violation of the Equal
Protection Clause exists because men and women are similarly situated with regards to the
constitutional right of autonomy.”); see also Marjorie M. Shultz, Abortion and the Maternal–
Fetal Conflict: Broadening Our Concerns, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 79, 93 (1992)
(“Men also have interests in their genetic progeny and in their reproductive autonomy. If
we object to what some characterize as coerced motherhood, can we close our ears to pleas
about coerced fatherhood?” (footnotes omitted)).
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to engage in reproductive sexual activities.
Without this
191
symmetry, there is no choice.”
In sum, given the serious problems discussed in this Part,
courts simply have to start taking a different approach to the
issue. In doing so, courts must continue their attempts at
protecting the child’s best interest, but at the same time, they also
must not further punish victims of sexual assault. The solution
lies in incorporating a consent requirement, as proposed below.192
Before doing so, however, it is first necessary to understand a
narrow area of child support law in which consent already
operates as an affirmative defense—the law of artificial
insemination—for this area of law serves as the basis for Part VI’s
proposal.
V. THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND THE NECESSITY OF
CONSENT
Whereas courts have refused to consider consent when
adjudicating the child support obligations of men who are victims
of sexual assault, when it comes to the law of artificial
insemination, consent is crucial to determining the identity of the
“father” (i.e., the individual liable for child support). By way of
introduction, artificial insemination, as it exists in its most typical
form, is a procedure whereby “a woman is impregnated with
semen from a man not her husband in a simple procedure that can
be accomplished with a syringe.”193 What makes the insemination
“artificial” is the fact that “the male agent is not engaged in the
act.”194 Thus, whenever a child is conceived using artificial
PAUL R. ABRAMSON ET AL., SEXUAL RIGHTS IN AMERICA: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND
10 (2003).
192 See infra Part VI.
193 Walter Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L.
REV. 465, 468 (1983). By “most typical form,” this Article is referring to heterologous
artificial insemination. There is also “homologous artificial insemination,” whereby “[a]
married woman is impregnated with the semen of her husband when normal copulation
fails because of various medical problems.” Id. at 469.
194 Janet Farrell Smith, Remarks at Workshop on Ethical Issues in Human Reproduction
Technology: Analysis by Women, Manipulative Reproductive Technologies Discussion:
Part I (June 1979), in THE CUSTOM-MADE CHILD? WOMEN-CENTERED PERSPECTIVES 253,
255 (Helen B. Holmes et al. eds., 1981) (noting that “this account leaves out the female
191
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insemination, a question arises as to who is the legal father of that
child. In most cases, the choice comes down to one of two men,
either the husband of the mother or the sperm donor. As the
remainder of this Part explains, however, for either to be the
father, consent is required.
A. HUSBANDS OF WOMEN WHO HAVE BEEN ARTIFICIALLY
INSEMINATED

In most jurisdictions, if a married woman is artificially
inseminated with the sperm of a third party, her husband is only
liable for the financial support of the resulting child if he
consented to the insemination.195 For example, the Tennessee
statute that deals with artificial insemination states that “[a] child
born to a married woman as a result of artificial insemination,
with consent of the married woman’s husband, is deemed to be the
legitimate child of the husband and wife.”196 Further, most states
require that the consent of the husband be in writing, an example
of which can be found in the Minnesota statue, which provides
that “the husband is treated in law as if he were the biological
father of the child thereby conceived [via artificial insemination];”
however, “[t]he husband’s consent must be in writing and signed
by him and his wife.”197 In applying a similar statute requiring
written consent, a New Mexico court held that the purpose behind
the written consent requirement is two-fold:
First, the writing serves an evidentiary function. The
existence of a document signed by the husband and the
entirely, especially the fact that the natural process of conception occurs in the woman’s
body” and, as a result, “ ‘[a]rtificial insemination’ reflects a patriarchal, male-centered mode
of thinking”).
195 Lewis, supra note 61, at 960.
196 TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (2006); see also In re Marriage of Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667
N.E.2d 122, 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that, because respondent—the husband of
petitioner—did not provide “his consent to petitioner or any support to her choice to
undergo artificial insemination . . . it would be inconsistent with public policy to force upon
respondent parental obligations which he declined to undertake”).
197 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2011). Additionally, “[t]he consent must be retained
by the physician for at least four years after the confirmation of a pregnancy that occurs
during the process of artificial insemination.” Id.; see also Lewis, supra note 61, at 961 n.66
(listing other state statutes that explicitly require written consent).
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wife avoids disputes regarding whether consent was
actually given. Second, the requirement serves a
cautionary purpose.
One who pauses to sign a
document can be expected to give more thought to the
consequences of consent than one who gives consent in
a less formal setting.198
A few states, however, take a slightly different approach when
deciding the parental obligations of a man whose wife undergoes
artificial insemination. In Maryland, for instance, the husband is
simply presumed to be the father of the resulting child: “A child
conceived by artificial insemination of a married woman with the
consent of her husband is the legitimate child of both of them for
all purposes. Consent of the husband is presumed.”199 Other states
follow a similar presumption, yet offer the husband a limited
window of time in which he may successfully elude his support
obligations by proving lack of consent. For example, Delaware law
provides that “the husband of a wife who gives birth to a child by
means of assisted reproduction” is not liable for child support if
“(1) Within [two] years after learning of the birth of the child he
commences a proceeding to adjudicate his paternity; and (2) [t]he
court finds that he did not consent to the assisted reproduction,
before or after birth of the child.”200
Even in states where consent is not presumed, courts can be
quite permissive in extrapolating from the surrounding
circumstances a husband’s consent to serve as the child’s father.
For instance, some states have held that a husband’s consent to
artificial insemination “may be express, or it may be implied from
conduct which evidences knowledge of the procedure and failure to

Lane v. Lane, 912 P.2d 290, 295 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (LexisNexis 2011); see also ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 28-9-209(c) (2009) (“Any child conceived following artificial insemination of a married
woman with the consent of her husband shall be treated as their child for all purposes of
intestate succession. Consent of the husband is presumed unless the contrary is shown by
clear and convincing evidence.”).
200 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-705(a) (2009). Other states follow a similar approach. See
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-705(1) (LexisNexis 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-905(a) (2009).
Texas allows a husband to bring an action challenging paternity within four years. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.705(a) (West 2010).
198
199
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object.”201 Texas, for example, provides that “[c]onsent by a
married woman to assisted reproduction must be in a record
signed by the woman and her husband.”202 The statute, though,
qualifies this language with the following: “Failure by the husband
to sign a consent . . . before or after the birth of the child does not
preclude a finding that the husband is the father of a child born to
his wife if the wife and husband openly treated the child as their
own.”203
In fact, even those states that have statutes requiring written
consent have nonetheless avoided a strict reading of the statute
when the husband’s subsequent actions indicate an acceptance of
the child as his own. For example, in Lane v. Lane, the husband
and wife had married in 1984; however, prior to the marriage, the
husband underwent a vasectomy.204 Desiring a child with her new
husband, however, the wife decided to get pregnant using artificial
insemination.205 Although the husband participated in the process
(i.e., by “driving Wife for some medical visits, attending birthing
classes, and being present in the delivery room”),206 he never
formally consented in writing either before the insemination or
afterwards.207 Nonetheless, the husband played an active role in
the child’s rearing, treating the resulting daughter (Colleen) in all
respects as his own child.208 In 1991, the couple filed for divorce,
and the wife sought sole custody of the child on the grounds that

201 In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 879 (S.C. 1987) (citing R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1983)); see also Karen De Haan, Note, Whose Child Am I? A Look at How Consent
Affects a Husband’s Obligation to Support a Child Conceived Through Heterologous
Artificial Insemination, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 809, 812–14 (1998–1999) (discussing In re Baby
Doe and similar cases).
202 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.704(a) (West 2010).
203 Id. § 160.704(b); accord WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.715(2) (West 2011) (establishing
similar, gender neutral, statutory regime).
204 912 P.2d 290, 292 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
205 Id. Initially, he was “hesitant” to have children and “refused to have his vasectomy
reversed”; however, “after Wife stated that she would leave Husband if she could not have
children, Husband and Wife explored various options.” Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. Despite the fact that “[t]he customary practice of the University of New Mexico
Hospital was not to undertake artificial insemination without the signed consent of both the
husband and the wife,” there were no consent forms bearing the signature of the husband,
only the wife. Id.
208 Id. (“Wife encouraged Husband to be an active parent, and he was.”).
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the husband never gave written consent to the insemination as
required by state statute and thus was not the child’s father.209 In
rejecting this argument, the court noted, at the outset, that “even
though a statute constitutes a command to the courts regarding
what law to apply, the command must be read with
intelligence.”210 Furthermore, in looking at the statute, the court
made the following observations:
The statute does not require any particular form of
words for the consent. Given the purposes of the
statute, a writing should be satisfactory if it conveys in
some manner that (1) the husband knows of the
conception by artificial insemination, (2) the husband
agrees to be treated as the lawful father of the child so
conceived, and (3) the wife agrees that the husband
will be treated as the lawful father of the child.
We also note that the New Mexico Act does not
prescribe when the written consent must be executed.211
With these principles in mind, the court ultimately found that
the husband had substantially complied with the statute.
Specifically, the court first looked to the pleadings that the
husband and wife had filed in the divorce action—over two years
after the child in question had been born: “Husband verified his
petition claiming Colleen as a ‘minor child[ ] of the marriage.’ Wife
likewise verified the response, which admitted that ‘there is one
minor child of the marriage, Colleen Dawn Lane,’ and did not
challenge Husband's paternity in any manner.”212 Additionally, the
court relied on the fact that both parties had signed a stipulated
order which stated: “The parties agree and stipulate as follows: 1.
The parties are the parents of Colleen Dawn Lane, born
Id. at 294 (“Wife further argues that strict compliance with the statutory requirements
is called for because of the precious maternal rights that are at stake.”).
210 Id. at 295 (noting that the legislature “cannot anticipate every contingency . . . [but]
can, however, expect that when one of its orders . . . is to be carried out, those who have that
duty . . . will discern its purpose and act in accordance with its essence if not necessarily its
letter”).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 296 (alteration in original).
209
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August 26, 1988.”213 Based on this evidence, the court rejected the
wife’s claim:
Although no document was signed by both Husband
and Wife, and one of the pleadings was signed only by
their attorneys, these pleadings unequivocally
demonstrate that more than two and one-half years
after the birth of Colleen, and even after the marriage
had failed, both Husband and Wife were acknowledging
Husband’s status as Colleen’s natural father.214
Regardless of how willing courts may be to find consent even in the
absence of a signed writing, the point remains that when it comes
to the husband of a woman who is artificially inseminated, some
form of consent is required before he will be liable for the support
of that child.
B. THE THIRD-PARTY SPERM DONOR

In most states, the man who donates his sperm for use in
artificial insemination is not treated as the father of any resulting
child.215 For example, Alabama law, which is emblematic of most
states’ approach to this issue, provides as follows: “A donor who
donates to a licensed physician for use by a married woman is not
a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”216
213 Id. After securing new counsel, the wife’s counsel filed a motion for leave to amend,
“stating that ‘[t]he facts leading to the proposed Amended Response and Counterpetition
have recently come to light.’ The new pleadings for the first time alleged that Colleen was
conceived through artificial insemination and that Husband was neither her natural nor
legal father.” Id. at 293.
214 Id. at 296. In so holding, the court also found that facts of this case satisfied the dual
purposes behind the consent requirement. According to the court, first, “there is absolutely
no dispute in this case that Husband was fully aware of the artificial insemination and that
Wife knew that he was fully aware,” and second, “the pleadings referred to represent a
knowing consent by both Husband and Wife to treating Husband as the natural father of
the child born to Wife as a result of artificial conception.” Id.
215 Lewis, supra note 61, at 973 (“The approach taken by the [Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA)] and most states is to declare that the sperm donor is not a parent to the child.”
(footnotes omitted)).
216 ALA. CODE § 26-17-702 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); accord COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(2)
(2008) (“A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted
reproduction . . . .”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (West 2002) (same); UTAH CODE ANN.
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By not recognizing the donor as the father, these statutes relieve
the sperm donor of any financial liability for the resulting child.
Consider, for instance, Wisconsin’s statute, which has explicitly
codified this very point:
The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for
use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the
donor’s wife is not the natural father of a child
conceived, bears no liability for the support of the child
and has no parental rights with regard to the child.217
As this language makes clear, the donor is stripped not only of
financial responsibility, but also of his parental rights vis à vis the
child.218
Relieving the donor of parental rights and responsibilities
serves two important objectives.
First, doing so actually
encourages men to donate sperm as, under these statutes, they
need not worry about any resulting liability.219 And, indeed, the
liability in these cases could be quite large given that “a popular
sperm donor could potentially father dozens of children.”220
Second, under this approach, neither single mothers nor married
couples who conceive using sperm from a third-party donor need
worry about the donor making future claims on their child.221 As
the Supreme Court of Colorado points out: “[W]omen are not likely
to use donated semen from an anonymous source if they can later

§ 78B-15-702 (LexisNexis 2008) (same).
217 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(2) (West 1996).
218 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 555 (West 2007) (“An oocyte donor shall have no right,
obligation or interest with respect to a child born as a result of a heterologous oocyte
donation from such donor. A child born as a result of a heterologous oocyte donation shall
have no right, obligation or interest with respect to the person who donated the oocyte
which resulted in the birth of the child.”).
219 See In re Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 32 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (noting that such laws
provide “men with a statutory vehicle for donating semen to married and unmarried women
alike without fear of liability for child support” (quoting Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal.
Rptr. 530, 534 (Ct. App. 1986))).
220 Lewis, supra note 61, at 975.
221 Id.; see also R.C., 775 P.2d at 32 (recognizing the policy of “extending to unmarried
women the protection afforded to married women under the UPA to use donated semen for
use in artificial insemination without fear of paternity suits.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1761333

446

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:407

be forced to defend a custody suit and possibly share parental
rights and duties with a stranger.”222
Nonetheless, parties can elect to deviate from this general
approach and affirmatively provide the sperm donor with parental
rights and responsibilities.223 To do so, however, all involved must
affirmatively consent to this deviation. A few states require such
consent to be in writing. New Jersey law, for example, provides:
“Unless the donor of semen and the woman have entered into a
written contract to the contrary, the donor . . . shall have no rights
or duties stemming from the conception of a child.”224 Likewise,
the relevant statute in Kansas provides that “[t]he donor of semen
provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination . . . is treated in law as if he were not the birth father
of a child thereby conceived, unless agreed to in writing by the
donor and the woman.”225
Other states, even in the absence of a statutory exception, have
found ways around the statutes that deny parental rights and
responsibilities to sperm donors when the parties’ conduct evinces
an intent that the donor serve as the child’s father. For example, in
In re Interest of R.C., the mother, E.C., asked her friend, J.R., to
donate sperm with which she could be artificially inseminated.226
J.R. agreed, and E.C. (who was unmarried) successfully used his
sperm to give birth to a child, R.C.227 Following the birth, E.C.
eventually refused to allow J.R. see the child, prompting J.R. to
bring a paternity action.228 In his action, J.R. claimed that he and
E.C. had an oral agreement whereby he had agreed to provide
sperm in exchange for parental rights.229 Further, J.R. claimed that
222 R.C., 775 P.2d at 33. Likewise, “anonymous donors are not likely to donate semen if
they can later be found liable for support obligations.” Id.
223 Lewis, supra note 61, at 975 (“Under the laws of some states, it is possible for the
sperm donor to become financially responsible for the artificially conceived child.”).
224 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 1993).
225 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(f) (West 1994).
226 775 P.2d at 28. E.C. claimed, however, that it was J.R.’s idea to donate sperm. Id. at
28 n.1.
227 Id. at 27–28.
228 Id. at 28 (“J.R. claims that E.C. said that she would not let him see R.C. again unless
he signed a release of his parental rights. He refused to sign the release.”).
229 Id. (“He alleges that E.C. had been the one to solicit J.R. to donate his semen; that he
donated the semen only because E.C. promised that J.R. would be treated as the father of
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he had taken actions in reliance on the agreement and had even
been allowed to play an active role in the child’s life, including
that when he learned E.C. was pregnant, J.R. bought
clothing, toys, and books for R.C.; that he opened a
college trust fund for R.C. and furnished a room in his
house as a nursery; that he “provided for [R.C.] in the
event of [J.R.’s] death;” that he attended birthing
classes with E.C.; that he was a “guest of honor” at
E.C.’s baby showers; that he assisted in the delivery of
R.C.; that he occasionally handled night feedings of
R.C.; that he “took care of [E.C.] and [R.C.] on a daily
basis” during the first week of R.C.’s life; that E.C.
both knew about and encouraged J.R.’s conduct; and
that he intended to retain a parental relationship with
R.C. at the time J.R. donated his semen.230
The governing statute in Colorado, which E.C. argued
preempted J.R.’s paternity claim, provided that “[t]he donor of
semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a woman other than the donor’s wife is treated in
law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby
conceived.”231 The Supreme Court of Colorado, however, rejected
her argument. In interpreting and applying the governing statute,
that court first noted that the parental rights of a semen donor are
“least clearly understood when the semen donor is known and the
recipient is unmarried.”232 The court then ruled that the statute
did not apply when a man donated semen to an unmarried woman

any child conceived by the artificial insemination.”).
230 Id. (quoting J.R.’s pleadings and affidavits).
231 Id. at 30 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(2) (Supp. 1988)).
This provision is
based on the UPA and “[w]ith the important exception of the omission of the word ‘married’
in subsection (2), section 19-4-106 of the Colorado UPA is a verbatim reproduction of
section 5 of the model UPA.” Id.
232 Id. at 33–34 (“In extending the protection of section 19-4-106 to unmarried women
without delineating the rights of the affected parties, the General Assembly failed to
provide the guidance not employed by the model UPA. For these reasons, we conclude that
section 19-4-106(2) is ambiguous with respect to the rights and duties of known donors and
unmarried recipients.”).
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with the understanding that he would be the father of the
resulting child:
[T]he General Assembly neither considered nor
intended to affect the rights of known donors who gave
their semen to unmarried women for use in artificial
insemination with the agreement that the donor would
be the father of any child so conceived. [The statute]
simply does not apply in that circumstance.233
In ruling, the court also noted that the parties’ intent is “a
relevant consideration in determining whether the known donor’s
parental rights were extinguished.”234
As a final point, it is important to highlight the fact that most of
these donor statutes only extinguish the parental rights/obligations
of the sperm donor if the artificial insemination was done by a
licensed physician.235 For example, in Jhordan C. v. Mary K.,
Jhordan provided semen directly to Mary, who then inseminated
herself at home.236 Given the fact that no physician was involved in
the insemination, as was required by state statute, the court held
that Jhordan was the father of the resulting child.237 In ruling, the
court noted that “nothing inherent in artificial insemination
requires the involvement of a physician.”238 Nonetheless, the court
found “at least two sound justifications” for the statute requiring
physician involvement.239 The first was health related: “a physician
can obtain a complete medical history of the donor . . . and screen
Id. at 35.
Id. at 34.
235 See Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for
Legislation, 44 LA. L. REV. 1641, 1649 n.40 (1984) (listing representative state statutes).
236 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 531–32 (Ct. App. 1986).
237 Id. at 535 (“The Legislature’s apparent decision to require physician involvement in
order to invoke the statute cannot be subject to judicial second-guessing and cannot be
disturbed, absent constitutional infirmity.”).
238 Id. (“Artificial insemination is, as demonstrated here, a simple procedure easily
performed by a woman in her own home.”); see also C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 821–22 (N.J.
Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977) (woman inseminated herself using a glass syringe and glass jar);
McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 241 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (woman inseminated herself
without physician’s assistance); L. v. L., [1949] P. 211, 212–13 (Eng.) (wife inseminated
herself with husband’s sperm).
239 Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
233
234
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the donor for any hereditary or communicable diseases.”240 Second,
“the presence of a professional third party . . . can serve to create a
formal, documented structure for the donor-recipient relationship,
without which . . . misunderstandings between the parties
regarding the nature of their relationship and the donor's
relationship to the child would be more likely to occur.”241
On a related note, the physician requirement also likely
protects against fraud. Indeed, but for the physician requirement,
fathers may be tempted to try and avoid liability (and, conversely,
mothers may try and deny a father parental rights) by claiming
that the child was merely a result of home insemination instead of
sexual intercourse.
Judges would have some difficulty
adjudicating such claims given that most acts of sexual intercourse
and, presumably, home insemination would take place without
corroborating witnesses.
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
As the previous Part illustrates, when it comes to adjudicating
child support claims, the child’s interest in receiving support from
both parents does not always mean that the biological father is
strictly liable. For example, a child born to a single mother as a
result of artificial insemination performed under a doctor’s
supervision would likely have no right of support from the
biological father.242 Instead, the law would only view the child as
having one parent—the mother—despite the fact that the child’s
best interest would almost certainly be to receive support from
both biological parents.
Although this is merely a limited
exception to a biological father’s strict duty to support his children,
it is nonetheless a necessary and important one for the reasons
discussed earlier.243 Further, as proposed below, jurisdictions
Id.
Id. at 535. But see Marc E. Elovitz, Reforming the Law to Respect Families Created by
Lesbian and Gay People, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 431, 442 n.49 (1995) (“Reasons against the
physician requirement include the woman’s right to privacy and autonomy, the cost of
physician involvement and a preference for performing artificial insemination at home.”).
242 The same would be true of a child born to a married woman, via artificial insemination,
if her husband did not consent in any way to the procedure. See supra Part V.A.
243 See supra Part IV.
240
241
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should extend the exception to cover those fathers who never
consented to the sexual act that resulted in a biological child.
Of course, the policies underlying the need for consent in the
artificial insemination context differ somewhat from those
involving men who become fathers as a result of sexual assault.
Again, requiring consent in the case of sperm donors encourages
donation and, at the same time, protects donees from future
paternity claims.244 Similarly, for the husband of the donee, the
courts require his consent so as not to foist parental rights and
responsibilities on a man who has no biological connection to the
child.245 In contrast, the men this Article focuses on are, in fact,
the biological fathers of the children in question. Additionally,
because they never intended to donate sperm, there can be no
justification of trying to encourage donation. Nonetheless, as
discussed in Part IV, there are a number of serious policy concerns
raised by the courts’ practice of holding these fathers liable.
Therefore, a consent exception is just as necessary here as in the
artificial insemination cases.
Of course, this is not to say that a consent exception in these
cases should operate as it does in artificial insemination. After all,
a real danger of fraud exists in allowing a putative father to
simply raise lack of consent as a defense to a claim of child
support. Indeed, in an attempt to avoid liability, fathers might
routinely claim that they did not consent to the sexual act that
gave rise to a child, and given the private nature of most sexual
relations, courts would endure great difficulty ascertaining the
merits of such a defense. As such, for a consent defense to operate
effectively in this factual setting, it would need to be much more
narrow. Otherwise, an overly generous consent defense could
permit even meritorious claims for child support to ultimately fail.
For these reasons, states should adopt the following rule—
either legislatively or by encouraging courts to use their powers in
equity to effectuate the change—when dealing with claims that
the biological father did not consent to the act that resulted in the
mother’s pregnancy:

244
245

See supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text.
See supra Part V.A.
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A man is not the natural father of a child, bears no
liability for the support of the child, and has no
parental rights to the child if he can show, by clear and
convincing evidence, that he did not consent to the act
of sexual intercourse (or, in the case of home
insemination, to the act of self-insemination) that
resulted in the conception of the child.
This proposed rule imposes a number of limitations on those men
who might try to raise the defense. The remainder of this Part
discusses each of those limitations in turn.
A. LIMITING CONSENT TO THE SEXUAL ACT ITSELF

When it comes to making a baby, there are a number of steps,
and the rule proposed above would only absolve a man from
liability if he did not consent to one key part of the process.
Specifically, the defense would only extend to a man who did not
consent to the act of sexual intercourse itself or, in cases in which
there was no intercourse, to the act of self-insemination. Going
back to the story at the beginning of this article, then, S.F. could
make the claim that, because he was unconscious, he never
consented to have sexual intercourse with the mother and thus
should bear no child support obligations.246 Emile, however, could
not make such a claim as (1) he never had sexual intercourse with
the mother and (2) he did consent to some form of sexual activity
(i.e., oral sex) with the mother.247 Nonetheless, under the proposed
rule, he too could claim lack of consent as he never consented to
the use of his sperm for the purposes of self-insemination.
Notably absent from the protections of this defense are, first,
those men who became fathers after engaging in consensual sexual
intercourse with a woman under the mistaken impression that she
was incapable of conceiving a child.248 Under the proposed rule,
these men could not raise the consent defense given that it is
See supra notes 4–10, 108–17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16–22, 131–40 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text; see also Jill E. Evans, In Search of
Paternal Equity: A Father’s Right to Pursue a Claim of Misrepresentation of Fertility, 36
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1045, 1075 n.147 (2005) (listing cases).
246
247

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1761333

452

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:407

available only to those who did not consent to intercourse or selfinsemination. By limiting the rule this way, it would protect only
those men who would otherwise be deprived of their reproductive
choice should they be forced to pay child support for the resulting
child. After all, a man who willingly engages in sexual intercourse
with a woman—despite what the woman might have led him to
believe about her ability to conceive a child—is still very much in a
position to protect himself from becoming a father. Not only could
these men have chosen to use contraception, but they also could
have elected to simply abstain from sexual intercourse.
Accordingly, under this proposal, the law would remain unchanged
in those jurisdictions that have held men liable for child support
despite the mother’s misrepresentation that she was on birth
control and/or was sterile.249
Second, men like Jhordan C., discussed earlier, who consent to
a woman using their sperm to artificially inseminate herself
without the assistance of a licensed physician (referred to as
“home insemination” in the proposed rule) would continue to be
liable for the support of the resulting child.250 Indeed, such men
could not argue that they never consented to fatherhood and thus,
should not bear the legal obligations thereof. Again, the consent
defense proposed above would not cover claims that a man did not
consent to fatherhood in general, but only claims that he never
consented to the specific act of intercourse or self-insemination
that produced the child. Thus, the defense would not alter the
current rule that, if a man wishes to donate sperm to someone yet
escape all legal obligations to the child, a licensed physician must
perform the insemination.251
B. PROVING LACK OF CONSENT

Under the proposed rule, the burden of proving lack of consent
would fall on the biological father, and he would bear a rather
heavy burden. Specifically, to successfully avoid child support
249 Evans, supra note 248, at 1047 (“Child support obligations attach immediately upon
birth, without regard to whether fatherhood was desired or conception occurred through the
mother’s deceit as to her fertility or use of birth control.”).
250 See supra notes 236–41 and accompanying text.
251 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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obligations on the basis of lack of consent, a biological father would
have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he never
consented to the act in question (intercourse or self-insemination,
depending on the facts of the case).
The purpose of this
heightened standard would, again, be not only to protect against
fraudulent claims, but also to minimize frivolous claims that would
only waste judicial resources. Generally, under the clear and
convincing standard, a party “must convince the trier of fact that it
is highly probable that the facts he alleges are correct.”252
Family law is, of course, no stranger to the clear and convincing
standard; indeed, several areas of family law already employ this
heightened standard because the threat of fraud is great. For
example, courts in those states recognizing common law marriage
have noted that such claims are a “fruitful source of perjury and
fraud”253 and, as such, have placed a heavy burden on the party
claiming common law marriage.254 Similarly, in cases in which a
person challenges the validity of a former spouse’s subsequent
remarriage, the courts, recognizing the possibility of fraud, require
the complaining spouse to produce evidence that is “clear, strong,
and satisfactory and so persuasive as to leave no room for
reasonable doubt.”255
Applying this heightened standard here, victims of statutory
rape would have little difficulty meeting the required burden.
Specifically, they only have to prove that they were below the age
of consent at the time the child in question was conceived. State
legislators set the age of consent at a certain point for good

252 Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search for a
Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 462 (2002).
253 E.g., Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Pa. 1998).
254 See, e.g., Ashley Hedgecock, Comment, Untying the Knot: The Propriety of South
Carolina’s Recognition of Common Law Marriage, 58 S.C. L. REV. 555, 565 (2007) (“In
reality, the high burden of proof imposed on a claimant alleging common law marriage
successfully sorted fraudulent claims from legitimate ones.”).
255 E.g., Chandler v. Cent. Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 649, 652 (Kan. 1993). Called the “last-intime marriage presumption,” this doctrine applies in cases where a former spouse claims
some kind of spousal benefits on the basis that, even though the other spouse remarried,
there was no evidence of divorce from the former spouse. See Peter Nash Swisher &
Melanie Diana Jones, The Last-in-Time Marriage Presumption, 29 FAM. L.Q. 409, 409–10
(1995) (introducing the last-in-time presumption).
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reasons,256 and criminal laws relating to statutory rape as well as
those relating to child support should protect those below that age.
Moreover, given the relative ease with which a person can prove
his age, courts could fairly easily dispose of child support claims
involving male statutory rape victims under the consent defense.
Adult men, on the other hand, who claim the child was a
product of nonconsensual sex/insemination would have to resort to
other evidence to meet this high burden of proof. For this reason,
the burden may be quite difficult to meet in a number of cases.
Consider, for example, the case of S.F., discussed earlier, where
the father had evidence that the mother had told acquaintances
that she had sexually assaulted S.F. while he was sleeping.257
Now, a court could find that the mother’s admission of sexual
assault is sufficient evidence to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the father did not consent. Then again, a court
might be skeptical of such evidence given the danger of collusion.
Specifically, a mother and father could agree to both claim sexual
assault on the part of the mother whereby the child would
continue to collect welfare benefits and, yet, the father need not
reimburse the state.258 Admittedly, the threat of collusion poses a
difficult issue relating to proof. Hopefully, however, the threat of
being charged with sexual assault would discourage most mothers
from going along with such a scheme. Further, the father would
be dissuaded from bringing such a claim given that—as discussed
more fully below—should the consent defense succeed, he would
lose all parental rights vis-à-vis the child.259
However, in cases where a mother denies any claims of sexual
assault or nonconsensual self-insemination, the father would have
a much harder time satisfying his burden. Since most acts of
sexual intercourse, sexual assault, and, presumably, selfinsemination do not take place in public, it would be almost
impossible, absent some kind of admission from the mother, for
courts to decide whether or not the manner in which a child was
conceived was done with the biological father’s consent.
256
257
258
259

See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 4–10, 108–18 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.
See infra Part VI.C.
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Nonetheless, the failure of the consent defense to cover those more
questionable cases may send a message to potential fathers to not
put themselves in positions of vulnerability—such as passing out
drunk in a woman’s home260 or trusting relative strangers to
dispose of one’s semen.261
C. ACCEPTING THE GOOD WITH THE BAD

Finally, under this proposed consent defense, men who succeed
in proving lack of consent would not only avoid liability for child
support but they would also lose all parental rights vis-à-vis the
child in question. In other words, the availability of the consent
defense presents these men with an important choice: They can
elect to raise the defense, knowing that if they succeed they would
sever all rights and responsibilities with the child. Or, should they
wish to preserve their right to be the legal father of the child, they
can forgo raising the defense.
The reason for requiring such an election is that, first, it would
be entirely inequitable to allow a man to avoid supporting a child,
yet at the same time, allow him to, as one court put it, “enjoy[ ] the
benefits of his representation as the child’s father, including the
child’s love and affection, his status as father in the place of the
natural father, and the community’s recognition of him as the
father.”262 Similarly, a man who has acted as the child’s father
should be estopped from later attempting to avoid child support
obligations simply by claiming lack of consent to the child’s
For these reasons, courts should
conception/insemination.263
impose time limits similar to those used when dealing with the
husband of a woman who becomes pregnant via artificial
insemination; namely, the husband can avoid parental obligations

See supra notes 4–10, 108–18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16–22, 130–40 and accompanying text.
262 Wade v. Wade, 536 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
263 Courts have used a similar estoppel approach when adjudicating claims by husbands
that they never consented to their wives’ act of being artificially inseminated. See, e.g.,
Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ind. 1994) (noting that estoppel is the proper remedy
when “one party through his course of conduct knowingly misleads or induces another party
to believe and act upon his conduct in good faith without knowledge of the facts”).
260
261
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by raising lack of consent, but he must do so in a reasonable time
after learning of the child’s birth.264
Second, as discussed earlier, one of the biggest problems with
the court’s application of strict liability to victims of sexual assault
is that strict liability potentially deprives those men of any
meaningful choice when it comes to procreation.265 Again, the
proposed rule would give men a choice. As such, those victims who
nonetheless elect to father the resulting child have exercised their
ability to choose, and that choice should be honored along with all
of the legal obligations that choice entails. As the Supreme Court
has made clear, a biological connection provides a father with an
extremely valuable opportunity:
The significance of a biological connection is that it
offers the natural father an opportunity that no other
male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts
some measure of responsibility for the child’s future,
he may enjoy the blessings of the parent–child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions
to the child’s development.266
This need to protect a biological father’s decision to parent the
resulting child requires one additional point that should guide
courts when applying the consent defense—only the father can
raise the defense. Courts should not permit mothers to use the
defense as a means of depriving a biological father of parental
rights on the basis that he never consented to the conception. This
limitation comports with the common law maxim, the Wrongful
Conduct Rule: “A person cannot maintain a cause of action if he or
she must rely, in whole or in part, on an illegal or immoral act or
transaction to which he or she is a party.”267 Thus, the law should
not allow a mother to profit from her own wrongdoing; if the
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 185–91 and accompanying text.
266 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
267 1A C.J.S. Actions § 68 (2005); see also Joseph H. King, Jr., Outlaws and Outlier
Doctrines: The Serious Misconduct Bar in Tort Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1016
(2002) (defining the serious misconduct ban similarly).
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biological father, despite the mother’s actions, wishes to serve as
the legal father, the fact that he did not originally consent should
pose no bar to his claim.
Taken together, these limitations mean that only those men
who (1) never consented to the conception/insemination that
resulted in the birth of their biological child and (2) wish to have
no relationship with the resulting child should enjoy the benefit of
the proposed consent defense. After all, those men will suffer the
most harm should a court order them to pay child support for the
child they never wanted and who was conceived without their
consent. Further, these limitations help protect against any fears
that biological fathers seeking to evade child support obligations
resulting from conscious choices they made will improperly use the
consent defense.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the noble policies ostensibly supporting it, the practice
of holding biological fathers strictly liable for child support is not
without its shortcomings. Most problematic, however, is the way
in which men who never consented to the procreative act are
nonetheless held strictly liable for the support of the resulting
child. The time has come for courts to remedy this injustice and
all the attendant problems this practice poses—not only to male
victims of sexual assault, but also to society as a whole. Quite
simply, courts must adopt a consent defense that will better
protect these men, yet at the same time, not open child support
proceedings to meritless claims. Striking this balance will ensure
that courts never read a child’s interest in support, although very
much a worthy consideration, so broadly that it effectively
eviscerates a man’s ability to choose fatherhood. After all, when it
comes to procreative freedom, “choice” is an essential ingredient,
and as one feminist legal scholar deftly put it, “more is better than
less.”268
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